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THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE:




In 1921, the Italian playwright, Luigi Pirandello, presented
his now famous play Six Characters in Search of an Author.
This play was designed to illustrate, through a modification of
the dramatic technique, that characters have a life of their own
apart from the author, the actors, and the directors who create
and interpret them. This technique of presentation involved the
development of "a sense of chaos" which denied the audience
the type of certainty many would have welcomed with gratitude
and relief.1 Many members of the public and many of those en-
gaged in law enforcement have been similarly denied certainty
in the interpretation of the exclusionary rule during the past
twenty years. There seems little doubt that the "audience" of
the Supreme Court would welcome certainty with as much grati-
tude and relief as would the audience of the Pirandello play.
It may seem farfetched to compare the role of the Supreme
Court in its enforcement and interpretation of the exclusionary
rule to the sense of controlled chaos created by a dramatist in
emphasizing the independent life of a dramatic construct. How-
ever, an examination of the history and present application of
the exclusionary rule reveals that the meanderings of decisional
precepts, exacerbated by bare majority and plurality opinions,
have created chaos in law enforcement. Imposition of order that
might be derived from a unified collegial body is sorely needed.
Due to the philosophic disarray of its members, the Supreme
Court has not demonstrated the ability to control the exclusion-
ary rule, to define it, and to lend symmetry to its various appli-
cations and limitations. Consequently the exclusionary rule has
* Associate Justice, Rhode Island Supreme Court.
1. R. Oliver, Dreams of Passion, The Theater of Luigi Pirandello 54-55 (1975).
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developed a chaotic life of its own. The major question now is
whether the chaos can be characterized as "controlled." This ar-
ticle will demonstrate that the development and present con-
tours of the exclusionary rule have resulted from a series of ad
hoc determinations by the Supreme Court from which no coher-
ent principle may be derived.
II. BACKGROUND
In a recent article, Professor Yale Kamisar stated that the
exclusionary rule rested on constitutional "principle" rather
than "deterrence."'2 If one accepts this postulate and determines
that the establishment of the exclusionary rule for federal prose-
cutions in Weeks v. United States' was based upon principle
rather than deterrence of lawless official conduct, one becomes
embroiled in the determination and definition of the principle to
be served. This principle, I suggest, has developed a life of its
own quite separate from the one created by the nine justices of
the Weeks court.
Indeed, the Weeks decision does not attempt to furnish any
extensive rationale for its conclusion that evidence obtained in
violation of the fourth amendment should be excluded.4 When
2. Kamisar, A Defense of the Exclusionary Rule, 15 CRIMINAL LAW BULLETN 5, 6-7
(1979).
3. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
4. The opinion of the Court in Weeks v. United States contained only the following
statement in support of its holding that the exclusionary rule would apply to papers and
documents illegally seized by a United States marshall:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in
evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth
Amendment, declaring his right to be secure against such searches and
seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as
well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their offi-
cials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be
aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor
and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law
of the land.
232 U.S. at 293. The Court, however, began its prologue to the opinion by stating.
The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to
obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions...
should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts, which are charged at all
times with the support of the Constitution, and to which people of all condi-
tions have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental rights.
Id. at 392. This language may be interpreted as supporting the concept of the "impera-
tive of judicial integrity" mentioned in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).
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the exclusionary rule was later applied to the states in Mapp v.
Ohio,' Mr. Justice Harlan found it unclear whether the Weeks
opinion was based upon the supervisory power of the Supreme
Court over the federal judicial system or whether it was of con-
stitutional origin. For purposes of argument, however, he ac-
cepted the assumption of the majority that the rule was of con-
stitutional origin.6
In Mapp, four justices took the position that the principal
issue decided by the Ohio Supreme Court and tendered by the
jurisdictional statement was a first amendment challenge to an
Ohio statute which made mere knowing possession or control of
obscene material a criminal offense.7 Thus, the "principle" un-
derlying the exclusionary rule extended to the states in Mapp
was determined by five justices without the benefit of plenary
briefing and argument on the issue decided.8 In fact, the decision
in Mapp represented a summary reversal of Wolf v. Colorado,'
in which the Court had delivered a carefully researched opinion
noting the state courts' lack of reception of the Weeks doctrine
It is difficult to conclude from these statements whether the motivation of the court was
deterrence or constitutional principle.
5. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
6. 367 U.S. at 678 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Although making this assumption, Harlan
attacked the extension of the exclusionary rule to the states with the following
observations:
It cannot be too much emphasized that what was recognized in Wolf was
not that the Fourth Amendment as such is enforceable against the States as a
facet of due process, a view of the Fourteenth Amendment which, as Wolf it-
self pointed out, has long since been discredited, but the principle of privacy
"which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment." It would not be proper to
expect or impose any precise equivalence, either as regards the scope of the
right or the means of its implementation, between the requirements of the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. For the Fourth, unlike what was said in
Wolf of the Fourteenth, does not state a general principle only;, it is a particu-
lar command, having its setting in a preexisting legal context on which both
interpreting decision and enabling statutes must as least build.
Thus, even in a case which presented simply the question of whether a
particular search and seizure was constitutionally "unreasonable"--say in a
tort action against state officers-we would not be true to the Fourteenth
Amendment were we merely to stretch the general principle of individual pri-
vacy on a Procrustean bed of federal precedents under the Fourth
Amendment.
Id. at 678-79 (citations omitted).
7. Id. at 686 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
8. Id. at 676 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
9. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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and its complete rejection by English speaking jurisdictions in
the United Kingdom and British Commonwealth.1"
Regardless of the travail attendant upon its birth, the exclu-
sionary rule has unquestionably been with us since the Court
held in Mapp that the right to privacy embodied in the fourth
amendment could no longer be permitted to "remain an empty
promise."'" Later cases developed the exclusionary rule in terms
of Justice Harlan's stated fears that the substantive principles of
individual privacy would be stretched upon a "[p]rocrustean bed
of federal precedents under the fourth amendment" within
which state criminal procedure would be constrained.1 2 Thus,
the Supreme Court became the authoritative promulgator and
interpreter of a criminal procedure code applicable to the federal
jurisdictions and all fifty states.
III. PROBLEMS WITH SUBSTANTIVE APPLICATION OF THE RIGHT
To PRIVACY
At the time of Weeks v. United States,3 the specific guar-
antees contained in the first eight amendments to the Constitu-
tion of the United States were not thought to be applicable to
the states. 4 The application of the exclusionary rule was thus
limited to the administration of criminal justice in the federal
system, and the impact upon general law enforcement was not
heavily felt by the public at large.1 5 Hence, the extension of the
10. Id. at 29-30. Justice Frankfurter quoted the thoughtful opinion of Chief Justice
Cardozo in People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926), which also rejected the
adoption of the exclusionary rule:
No doubt the protection of the statute would be greater from the point of
view of the individual whose privacy has been invaded if the Government were
required to ignore what it had learned through the invasion. The question is
whether protection for the individual would not be gained at a disproportion-
ate loss of protection for society. On the one side is the social need that crime
shall be repressed. On the other, the social need that law shall not be flouted
by the insolence of office. There are dangers in any choice.
338 U.S. at 31 n.2, quoting People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 24-25, 150 N.E. 585, 589
(1926).
11. 367 U.S. at 660.
12. Id. at 679 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
13. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
14. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
15. The relative numerical importance of state as opposed to federal law enforce-
ment may be illustrated by figures set forth in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
In Argersinger, Justice Douglas pointed out that there were 24,000 felony cases in the
[Vol. 34
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exclusionary rule to the states in Mapp enormously enriched the
bill of fare of constitutional controversies to be presented to the
Supreme Court. In becoming the font of final wisdom in the area
of criminal constitutional safeguards, the Court assumed a for-
midable task. The emergency responses of urban police officers
to crime on the streets often bore little resemblance to the care-
fully prepared and documented cases handled by officers of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Treasury Department, and
other federal law enforcement agencies. Thus, the Court had to
promulgate rules relating to probable cause,"6 as well as investi-
gatory stops,1 7 searches incident to arrest,1 8 searches of
automobiles and other movable objects, 9  and inventory
searches.20 In the process, distinctions became increasingly more
subtle. It became difficult, if not impossible, for state and lower
federal tribunals - not to mention police officers - to follow
the shifting majorities that announced both refinements of old
doctrines and completely new constitutional requirements dur-
ing each term.
A. Automobile Searches
In Robbins v. California, Justice Stewart, writing for a
four-justice plurality, held that although the search of an auto-
mobile by California highway patrol officers was lawful, the war-
rantless opening of a container wrapped in plastic bags found in
a recessed compartment in the rear of a station wagon was con-
stitutionally impermissible under prior cases.2 The search in
federal system and 314,000 cases in the state systems. In addition to the felony cases,
there were between four and five million nontraffic misdemeanors in the state judicial
systems. Without reference to misdemeanor cases, the volume of serious criminal busi-
ness in the state systems was approximately thirteen times as great as that in the federal
judicial system. Id. at 34 n.4.
16. 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
17. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S.
143 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Chimel v. California,
395 U.S. 752 (1969).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1976); Chambers v. Maroney,
399 U.S. 42 (1970).
20. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976); Cady v. Dombrowski,
413 U.S. 433 (1973); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
21. 101 S. Ct. 2841 (1981).
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Robbins was based upon probable cause to believe the automo-
bile contained marijuana. The same day Justice Stewart deliv-
ered an opinion in New York v. Belton,3 which reversed the
New York Court of Appeals and held that the arrest of automo-
bile occupants would support a search of all containers, open or
closed, within the passenger compartment, with the exception of
the trunk, even when the occupants no longer had physical ac-
cess to the automobile.2' Thus, the United States Supreme
Court, through the medium of the same author, drew a distinc-
tion between the scope of an automobile search depending upon
whether the search was based on probable cause or was incident
to an arrest.
In probable reaction to the inherent practical difficulties of
implementing the plurality opinion in Robbins, the Court essen-
tially rejected the rationale of Robbins in United States v.
Ross.25 In Ross, the Court held that when police officers have
probable cause to believe that an automobile contains contra-
band, the scope of the search should be as broad as if it were
authorized by a valid warrant.26 This holding would justify the
search of every part of the automobile and its contents that may
conceal the object of the search. Such a search would include
closed containers (presumably ranging from paper bags to suit-
cases or boxes) in the manner in which a search authorized by a
warrant might take place.
An interesting aspect of the Ross opinion is that Justice
Stevens, writing for six members of the Court, did not find it
necessary to cite or discuss Belton. Consequently, while Ross
achieved the result of simplifying the scope of a search based
upon probable cause, there remains a significant distinction be-
tween a search based upon probable cause and a search incident
to an arrest. This distinction may, of course, be blurred by the
often encountered factual phenomena which may equate proba-
ble cause for arrest of an operator of an automobile with proba-
ble cause to search the motor vehicle. This may occur especially
in cases involving possession and sale of narcotics.
23. 101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981).
24. Id. at 2864.
25. 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982).
26. Id. at 2172.
258 [Vol. 34
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B. Questioning of Suspects
In Rhode Island v. Innis,27 the Court refined the teachings
of Brewer v. Williams28 and announced another subtle distinc-
tion in the application of the exclusionary rule. In Brewer, the
defendant's conviction was based, in part, on his response to a
noninterrogatory statement by a skilled police officer which was
designed to elicit and did elicit an incriminating response.2 The
Court reversed the defendant's conviction and excluded the im-
properly elicited evidence. In Innis, however, the Court upheld
the defendant's conviction under factual circumstances almost
identical to those in Brewer and announced the "functional
equivalent to interrogation" doctrine in reversing the Rhode Is-
land Supreme Court.
The Court defined the functional equivalent to interroga-
tion as words or actions of police that should be known to be
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
suspect.30 The Court found that the officer's statements in Innis,
while similar to those made in Brewer, did not constitute the
functional equivalent to interrogation because the defendant
failed to show that the police should have known that their
words and actions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminat-
ing response.31 Therefore, the Court held that the defendant's
response to the statement by the police was admissible.
Returning to Professor Kamisar's position that the exclu-
sionary rule rests upon principle rather than deterrence, '3 2 it is
difficult in Robbins and Belton and in Brewer and Innis to dis-
cern either the principle to be served or the deterrence to be
achieved. When one inserts a constitutional distinction in a
"barely visible space,"33 the principle achieved becomes scarcely
perceptible, and deterrence diminishes to the vanishing point.
27. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
28. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
29. 430 U.S. at 399.
30. 446 U.S. at 301.
31. Id. For a discussion of Innis, see Comment, The Supreme Court Narrows Defi-
nition of Interrogation to Allow Admission of Some Custodial Confessions, Rhode Is-
land v. Innis, 32 S.C.L. REv. 611 (1981).
32. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
33. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting).
2591982]
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IV. SUBSTANTIVE EXTENSIONS OF FOURTH AMENDMENT
PROTECTION
A. Protection of Dwelling Places
In Payton v. New York,3 the Court held unconstitutional a
state statute authorizing warrantless entry into a dwelling house
to arrest a person when probable cause existed to believe that he
had committed a felony. The New York police had probable
cause, after a two-day investigation, to arrest Payton for the
murder of a gas station manager. Detectives went to his apart-
ment, where they saw a light and heard music. They knocked,
obtained no response, and then entered by breaking open a
metal door. The apartment was unoccupied, but the police
found a 30 calibre shell casing, which was introduced as evidence
at the trial. The New York statute authorized forcible entry by
police officers to arrest a suspect without a warrant when there
was probable cause to believe that the occupant had committed
a felony.3 5 The Court, however, determined that in the absence
of exigent circumstances, a warrantless arrest may not be ef-
fected within the suspect's dwelling house. 6 Unfortunately, the
Court did not indicate in Payton what type of circumstances
might be deemed exigent.
Payton was followed the next term by Steagald v. United
States,7 in which the Court further extended protection to
dwelling houses. The Court held that an officer with an arrest
warrant could not search the dwelling of a third person in order
34. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
35. See 445 U.S. at 577 n.6. New York was in accord with a majority of the common
law commentators who took the position that warrantless entries into dwellings were
justified in order to arrest individuals when there was probable cause to believe that they
had committed felonies. See, e.g., 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *292; 1 J. CHrrn, A
PRACTICAL TREATISE ON CRIMINAL LAW 23 (London 1816); 2 M. HALE, HISTORY OF THE
PLEAS OF THE CROWN 85 (n.p. 1736).
36. 445 U.S. at 590. In arriving at this conclusion, the Court did not cite or discuss
its previous opinion in Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797 (1971), where the Court upheld an
entry and subsequent search of a dwelling house based upon probable cause to arrest the
occupant, even though it ultimately turned out that the person arrested was not the
person for whom probable cause existed. In Hill, the Court held that since the police had
probable cause to arrest Hill and probable cause to believe that the person arrested was
Hill, they were entitled to what they could have done if in fact the person arrested had
been Hill. 401 U.S. at 804.
37. 101 S. Ct. 1642 (1981).
260 [Vol. 34
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to apprehend the object of the warrant unless a search warrant
had been obtained.38 The officers in Steagald had a warrant to
arrest a drug fugitive and had reason to believe that he might be
present in the Steagald apartment. They entered the apartment
without a search warrant and uncovered cocaine during the
course of their search for the fugitive. The Court held that the
entry was illicit in the absence of exigent circumstances and the
cocaine was excluded from the evidence."
Neither Payton nor Steagald should be underestimated in
terms of extending fourth amendment protection and in their
impact upon law enforcement. Quoting Justice White's dissent
in Payton:
The policeman on his beat must now make subtle discrimina-
tions that perplex even judges in their chambers.
... Further, police officers will often face the difficult task
of deciding whether the circumstances are sufficiently exigent
to justify their entry to arrest without a warrant. This is a deci-
sion that must be made quickly in the most trying of circum-
stances. If the officers mistakenly decide that the circum-
stances are exigent, the arrest will be invalid and any evidence
seized incident to the arrest or in plain view will be excluded at
the trial. On the other hand, if the officers mistakenly deter-
mine that exigent circumstances are lacking, they may refrain
from making the arrest, thus creating the possibility that a
dangerous criminal will escape into the community. 0
If an arrest for murder is routine and does not by its nature
establish exigency, it is difficult to imagine a set of circum-
stances that would justify a warrantless entry. 1 It is obvious
that the definition and parameters of the term "exigent circum-
stances" will have to be worked out on a case-by-case basis and
will yield even more subtle distinctions. For every arrest or
search warrant which is issued, there are a multitude of warrant-
less arrests. Many take place in dwelling houses; undoubtedly
many take place in the dwelling houses of third persons. It is
38. Id. at 1653.
39. Id. at 1649.
40. 445 U.S. at 618-19 (White, J., dissenting).
41. In Riddick v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), the companion case to Payton, the
Court held that the arrest of a robbery suspect without a warrant was also termed rou-
tine. Id. at 583.
1982]
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difficult to conceive of a more fruitful source of litigation than
the question of the legality of these warrantless arrests in the
dwelling houses of suspects and arrests without search warrants
in the homes of third persons.
B. Repositories of Personal Effects
Beginning in 1977, the Court crafted another doctrine ex-
tending fourth amendment protection in a special way to the re-
positories of personal effects. In United States v. Chadwick,2
the Court clearly articulated the distinction between a search
and a seizure for the first time.43 The Court established that a
repository of personal effects was entitled to a higher degree of
protection than an automobile because of the greater expecta-
tion of privacy associated with the repository. The Chadwick
Court concluded that it was reasonable for the officers to seize
the repository, but once the exigency of mobility had been re-
moved, they could no longer reasonably open and search the re-
pository without the safeguards provided by a judicial search
warrant."
This decision was followed by Arkansas v. Sanders,5 in
which the Court again held that when police officers lawfully
stop an automobile and seize a piece of luggage, they must first
obtain a warrant before searching the luggage in the absence of
exigent circumstances. 46 This doctrine was later followed in
42. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
43. In Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), a case involving a search of a sta-
tion wagon after the station wagon had been removed from the place where its occupants
had been arrested, Justice White reasoned that for constitutional purposes there was no
distinction between seizing an automobile and holding it while a warrant was requested
from a magistrate and going forward with a search without a warrant, given the underly-
ing probable cause. Id. at 52. Later, in Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974), the Court,
passing upon the seizure of an automobile and the examination of its exterior, implied
that a distinction should be made between a seizure and a search. It was not until
United States v. Chadwick that this distinction was clearly articulated by the Court.
44. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1976). In Chadwick, officers who
had probable cause to believe that a double locked foot locker contained marijuana
seized the foot locker from the trunk of an automobile, brought the foot locker to the
Federal Building in Boston, and later opened the foot locker without having obtained a
warrant. As the officers reasonably believed, the foot locker contained a large quantity of
marijuana.
45. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
46. Id. at 766.
[Vol. 34
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Walter v. United States47 under somewhat bizarre circum-
stances. A shipment of cartons was mistakenly delivered to a
commercial establishment named L'Eggs Products, Inc. instead
of to the actual addressee, Leggs, Inc. Employees of L'Eggs
Products discovered pornographic films in the packages and
gave the films to FBI agents, who viewed the films without a
warrant. Ultimately, indictments were issued for interstate
transportation of obscene materials based upon five of the 875
films in the shipment. Justice Stevens, writing for the Court,
drew a distinction between the lawful possession of the boxes by
the FBI agents and the search of their contents. The Court held
that the opening of the packages without a warrant, in spite of
lawful possession, was constitutionally impermissible.48
V. LIMITATIONS ON THE APPLICATION OF THE EXCLUSIONARY
RULE
A. Contextual Limitations
Apart from the arcane substantive teaching contained in
Supreme Court opinions construing the appropriate commands
derived from the fourth amendment in particular cases, the
Court has developed a large body of procedural refinements re-
lating to the contexts in which the exclusionary rule can be in-
voked. The determination of these contexts depends to a great
extent upon the perceived purpose of the rule.
For example, in United States v. Calandra,"9 the Court de-
clined to apply the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings.
The rationale of this approach was based upon the determina-
tion that the principal purpose of the exclusionary rule is deter-
rence.50 Predicated upon this determination, the Court held:
Any incremental deterrent effect which might be achieved by
extending the rule to grand jury proceedings is uncertain at
best. Whatever deterrence of police misconduct may result
from the exclusion of illegally seized evidence from criminal
trials, it is unrealistic to assume that application of the rule to
47. 447 U.S. 649 (1980).
48. Id. at 659.
49. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
50. Id. at 347.
1982] 263
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grand jury proceedings would significantly further that goal. 1
Three justices dissented, arguing that it was essentially subver-
sive of the imperative of judicial integrity for courts to lend
themselves directly or indirectly to the sanctioning of unlawful
conduct.
52
In Stone v. Powell,5 the Court again limited the context in
which the exclusionary rule would be applied. The Court relied
on the same assumption that the principal rationale for the ex-
clusionary rule in fourth amendment cases was to deter lawless
conduct on the part of the police. 54 The Court withheld federal
habeas corpus jurisdiction for claims based upon assertions of
illegal searches or seizures when there was an adequate opportu-
nity to litigate such claims in the appropriate state tribunals. In
summary, Justice Powell asserted:
we conclude that where the State has provided an opportunity
for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a
state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief
on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional
search or seizure was introduced at his trial. In this context the
contribution of the exclusionary rule, if any, to the effectuation
of the Fourth Amendment is minimal and the substantial soci-
etal costs of application of the rule persist with special force.
5 5
51. Id. at 351.
52. Id. at 359. This phrase was taken from Justice Stewart's opinion in Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). After considering the reasons for overturning the
"silver platter doctrine" in Elkins, Justice Stewart concluded:
But there is another consideration-the imperative of judicial integrity. It
was of this that Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis so eloquently
spoke in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, at 469, 471, more than 30
years ago. "For those who agree with me," said Mr. Justice Holmes, "no dis-
tinction can be taken between the Government as prosecutor and the Govern-
ment as judge." 277 U.S. at 470 (Dissenting opinion.) "In a government of
laws," said Mr. Justice Brandeis, "existence of the government will be imper-
illed if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent,
the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its
example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it
breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it
invites anarchy .... 277 U.S. at 485 (Dissenting opinion).
364 U.S. at 222-23.
53. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
54, Id. at 486.
55. 428 U.S. at 494-95. Chief Justice Burger, in a concurring opinion, made an at-
tack upon the exclusionary rule itself. He questioned the deterrent effect of the rule by
suggesting:
12
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Justice White dissented on the ground that limiting the availa-
bility of the federal habeas corpus remedy constituted the wrong
approach. Nevertheless, he indicated an open mind to revision of
the exclusionary rule;
The rule has been much criticized and suggestions have been
made that it should be wholly abolished, but I would overrule
neither Weeks v. United States nor Mapp v. Ohio. I am never-
theless of the view that the rule should be substantially modi-
fied so as to prevent its application in those many circum-
stances where the evidence at issue was seized by an officer
acting in the good-faith belief that his conduct comported with
existing law and having reasonable grounds for this belief.5"
A more clumsy, less direct means of imposing sanctions is difficult to im-
agine, particularly since the issue whether the policeman did indeed run afoul
of the Fourth Amendment is often not resolved until years after the event. The
"sanction" is particularly indirect when . . . the police go before a magistrate,
who issues a warrant. Once the warrant issues, there is literally nothing more
the policeman can do in seeking to comply with the law. Imposing an admit-
tedly indirect "sanction" on the police officer in that instance is nothing less
than sophisticated nonsense.
Id. at 498. The Chief Justice went on to suggest that the "judicial integrity" rationaliza-
tion is fatally flawed in view of the standing requirements which the Court has tradition-
ally imposed upon assertion of fourth amendment violations. Id. at 499, citing Alderman
v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1969).
56. 428 U.S. at 537-38. An interesting example of the disenchantment of many
thoughtful people with the exclusionary rule may be found in the final report of the
Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime (August 17, 1981). In that report a
distinguished task force co-chaired by former Attorney General Griffin B. Bell and Gov-
ernor James R. Thompson of Illinois set forth Recommendation 40 in relation to the
exclusionary rule. That recommendation asserted that the fundamental and legitimate
purpose of the exclusionary rule was to deter illegal police conduct. The recommendation
went on to say:
In general, evidence should not be excluded from a criminal proceeding if
it has been obtained by an officer acting in the reasonable, good faith belief
that it was in conformity to the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. A
showing that evidence was obtained pursuant to and within the scope of a war-
rant constitutes prima facie evidence of such good faith belief.
The task force proceeded to recommend that the Attorney General and the Solicitor
General should urge this rule in appropriate court proceedings, or support federal legisla-
tion establishing this rule, or both. In the commentary, the task force cited United States
v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 946 (1981), in support
of this good faith rule.
A significant problem may be confronted in respect to the "good faith" approach.
For example, the assertion that the issuance of a warrant should under all circumstances
insulate a search or arrest against the exclusionary rule overlooks the element of the
possibility that a warrant might be issued on less than probable cause or without colora-
ble cause at all. In all likelihood, the framers of the fourth amendment were more con-
cerned by the general warrant than with warrantless searches and seizures. As James
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B. Individual Standing to Invoke the Exclusionary Rule
In addition to contextual limitations, the Court has recently
developed a new doctrine on the issue of the individual's stand-
ing to invoke the fourth amendment right to privacy and its en-
forcement arm, the exclusionary rule. It has long been settled
that only one whose right to privacy has been violated may seek
to exclude evidence derived from this violation.57 In Jones v.
United States '1, the Court established a relatively simple,
bright line rule of standing, holding that one charged with pos-
session of a forbidden substance had standing to object to the
means by which the substance was discovered and seized .5 The
Court further stated that any person lawfully on the premises
could object to a search of the premises.5
Eight years later, in Simmons v. United States,0 the Court
held that testimony adduced in order to establish standing could
not be used against a defendant in the trial of a criminal case. 1
Although Simmons opened the door to the establishment of
standing without penalty, the Court gradually increased the
stringency of standing requirements as a result of the availabil-
ity of this device. In Brown v. United States,62 the defendants
moved to suppress evidence illegally seized at a codefendant's
warehouse. The trial court denied the motion and the Supreme
Court affirmed, holding that defendants had no standing to con-
test a search and seizure when they (1) were not on the premises
at the time of the search, (2) had no proprietary or possessory
interest in the premises, and (3) were not charged at the time of
the challenged search and seizure with an offense that included
possession of the seized evidence as an essential element
Otis declared so persuasively, one of the most flagrant abuses of privacy in the colonial
period was the easy issuance of general warrants and their widespread use by officers of
the Crown to search persons and places without a shred of probable cause.
Thus, the recommendation of the Attorney General's Task Force does not furnish a
panacea for the almost metaphysical complexities created by the fine distinctions drawn
over the years in varying contexts by the Supreme Court.
57. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261-62 (1960).
57.1. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
58. Id. at 264.
59. Id. at 267.
60. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
61. Id. at 394.
62. 411 U.S. 223 (1973).
[Vol. 34
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thereof.63 Although not essential to the determination of the
case, Brown suggested that the automatic standing rule of
Jones, was no longer necessary in light of Simmons.e4
Five years later in Rakas v. Illinois,5 the Court overturned
one element of the Jones standing rule. Although the petitioners
in that case were passengers in an automobile and therefore "le-
gitimately on the premises," the Court held that this fact was
not determinative of whether they had a legitimate expectation
of privacy in the particular portions of the automobile that had
been searched.6 The Court further suggested that the Jones
rule of according standing to any person legitimately on the
premises had too broad a gauge for measurement of fourth
amendment rights.67 The automatic standing rule of Jones,
which allowed those charged with possessory offenses to chal-
lenge the search or seizure that produced the offending article or
substance, was overturned in United States v. Salvucci. 8 Here
again the Court, in directly overturning the automatic standing
rule, relied upon the suggestions in Brown that it was no longer
needed in light of the opportunity to establish standing offered
by Simmons. 9
However, lest one infer that standing may be established by
assertion or evidence of ownership of seized articles, a further
hurdle was established by Rawlings v. Kentucky.70 In that case
police officers entered the home of a man named Marquess,
armed with a warrant for his arrest. The officers did not find
Marquess, but discovered marijuana seeds on a bedroom mantel
while looking for him. The police then detained visitors to the
Marquess dwelling, including Rawlings and Vanessa Cox. Rawl-
63. Id. at 229. The owner of the warehouse in Brown also challenged use of the
evidence against him, and the trial court suppressed such use.
64. Id.
65. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
66. Id. at 148. In Rakas, the police, after ordering the occupants out of the car,
searched it and found rifle shells in the glove compartment and a sawed off rifle under
the front passenger seat. The Court held that the passengers had no legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy in that particular area. The Court further stated that automobiles were
not to be treated identically with houses or apartments. However, it was also suggested
in dictum that one legitimately in a house or apartment might not have reasonable ex-
pectations of privacy in all areas of the structure.
67. Id. at 142.
68. 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
69. Id. at 89-90.
70. 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
1982] 267
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ings had earlier placed 1800 tablets of LSD and other controlled
substances in Cox's handbag. When the police ordered Cox to
empty her purse and the contraband was revealed, Cox told the
defendant to take his property. At that point Rawlings admitted
ownership of the drugs and was later indicted for possession
with intent to sell the controlled substances. In a further exten-
sion of the standing requirements, the Court held that Rawlings
had no standing to object to the search of the purse of Vanessa
Cox because he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the
purse, nor did he have a right to exclude others from it.71 The
Court held that the defendant's claim of ownership of the drugs
was only one fact to be considered and noted that had he placed
his drugs in plain view, he could not claim any legitimate expec-
tation of privacy even though he would still have owned the
drugs.72 This observation would suggest that even an assertion of
ownership will not confer standing unless the place of conceal-
ment is one in which the defendant has a legitimate expectation
of privacy. Thus, the question of standing seems to have become
intertwined with the validity of the search. In light of Rawlings,
the legitimate expectation of privacy becomes an essential ele-
ment in determining standing, whether or not the defendant as-
serts ownership of the materials seized.
It appears that even egregious conduct on the part of police
officials will not relax the standing requirements. In United
States v. Payner," federal officers clandestinely, and in utter
disregard of the right of privacy of the victim, copied the con-
tents of a third party bank officer's brief case in order to obtain
evidence that Payner had falsified a tax return. Nevertheless,
the Court held that even the supervisory power of the federal
court would not extend to the suppression of evidence unlaw-
fully seized from a third party not before the Court.7 4 Using the
deterrent rationale, the Court stated that Payner had no stand-
ing to challenge the seizure of bank records in which he had no
reasonable expectation of privacy, and that he had no standing
to seek exclusion of tainted evidence when he was not the victim
71. Id. at 105-06.
72. Id. at 106.
73. 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
74. Id. at 735.
[Vol. 34268
16
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol34/iss2/3
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
of the challenged practices.75 This seems to be a complete rejec-
tion of the imperative of judicial integrity theory and conditions
the deterrence rationale upon the standing of a criminal
defendant.
VI. CONCLUSION
Two distinct trends in opposite directions are apparent in
the fourth amendment area. Standing and contextual require-
ments for application of fourth amendment protection and the
exclusionary rule have become more restrictive. At the same
time the substantive protection of the fourth amendment has
been extended in the area of arrests and in the protection given
to dwelling places and repositories of personal effects. From the
foregoing case discussions, it would, I believe, be appropriate to
conclude that no overriding principle underlying the exclusion-
ary rule is applicable under all circumstances. A substantial
number of justices base the exclusionary rule upon the idea of
its deterrence to lawless police conduct. A minority of the jus-
tices would emphasize the imperative of judicial integrity. Per-
haps only Justices Brennan and Marshall could now be included
in the latter category on a consistent basis. It therefore seems
that the United States Supreme Court has been no more able to
capture the "principle" underlying the exclusionary rule than
the six characters of Pirandello were able to find an author who
would give them complete depth and meaning. As a result, the
exclusionary rule has followed a tortuous and essentially unprin-
cipled life based upon a series of ad hoc determinations. No
great jurisprudential philosophic underpinnings can be
perceived.
The plain fact of the matter is that the exclusionary rule
needs a consistent underlying principle to support it. In no other
area of judicial exercise of authority have courts received such a
groundswell of criticism from the press and the community than
in the application of the exclusionary rule to release an obvi-
ously guilty person who has committed a serious and highly pub-
licized criminal offense. It simply will not do to rest such a rule
solely on the issue of judicial integrity. When an ordinary police
75. Id. at 732.
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officer has misinterpreted the arcane learning which underlies
the application of the exclusionary rule, confidence in judicial
integrity will not be increased by releasing a vicious murderer
upon the community. Similarly, lawless official conduct also
threatens the liberties of all citizens. The common law has al-
ways been flexible enough to balance competing interests in such
a way as to protect both individual and societal considerations.
In interpreting the Constitution of the United States, the Su-
preme Court must also balance competing interests between the
societal need for security of its citizens and the liberties of the
individual. This is not an easy task and is perhaps not suscepti-
ble of neat doctrinal formulae. Perhaps the first step in the anal-
ysis should be the recognition that inconsistencies are inevitable
and the promulgation of general rules will immediately beget ex-
ceptions upon exceptions.
When the Supreme Court of the United States took upon
itself the task of supervising the procedural safeguards to be ap-
plied by officials in fifty sovereign jurisdictions as well as its own
federal law enforcement administrative and judicial hierarchy, it
was indeed assuming a formidable task. This task is often ill
served by the lack of collegiality of that tribunal in approaching
the issue. The deep philosophic divisions within the Court make
the articulation of understandable rules based upon clear princi-
pled foundations even more difficult than the enormously hard
cases submitted would inevitably require. It might be suggested
that the nine authors continue with all of their efforts to pursue,
if not a single principle, then a set of principles which may be
applied with some degree of consistency and logical symmetry.
Perhaps the pursuit of the perfect rule is less likely to achieve
success than a more pragmatic approach to workable
compromise.
It cannot be too strongly emphasized that a consensus upon
the Court should be a prime objective. Five-to-four decisions
with vigorous dissents are far less likely to persuade the profes-
sional or lay reader than a decision to which all members of the
Court subscribe. Even more subversive of the Court's moral in-
fluence is the plurality opinion. 8 A tribunal which assumes the
76. This phenomenon has unfortunately become more common in recent years.
There were 45 plurality decisions from 1801 to 1955. There were 42 plurality decisions
from 1955 until the end of the Warren Court. During the tenure of the Burger Court
[Vol. 34
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duty of regulating the conduct of all law enforcement agencies
and of exercising revisory power over all other judicial bodies
must continually demonstrate its competence. Competence will
seldom be perceived in any organization, judicial or otherwise,
whose membership is in philosophic disarray.
Let us end as we began with a reference to Pirandello's six
characters:
When a character is born, he acquires at once such an indepen-
dence, even of his own author, that he can be imagined by eve-
rybody even in many other situations where the author never
dreamed of placing him; and so he acquires for himself a mean-
ing which the author never thought of giving him.7
Consequently, it may be fruitless to look back to Weeks or
Mapp in order to discern the principles and purposes upon
which the exclusionary rule has its philosophic foundation. It
might be better to concentrate upon the present context in
which the rule exists and the purposes which it might best serve
now and in the future in light of experience since 1914 and espe-
cially since 1961. Obviously these principles and purposes must
be fashioned and recognized by the nine authors who currently
serve on the Supreme Court of the United States. Nevertheless,
in their quest certain touchstones might be observed. First, the
rules of exclusion should be based upon standards sufficiently
clear and understandable so they can be observed and followed
by police officials. Second, whenever possible, bright-line distinc-
tions should be preferred over the obscure and the recondite.
Third, rules of substance and procedure should be articulated
precisely and promulgated with the realization that a decision in
a particular case may have ramifications which exceed the
boundaries of the controversy from whence it arose. Finally, rig-
orous efforts should be exercised to achieve unanimity so the
Court's opinions may command the respect of its own members
as a condition precedent to obtaining general professional and
public acceptance. The principle of judicial integrity and the
purpose of deterrence of lawless official conduct, although not
until the end of the 1980 term 88 plurality decisions were rendered.
See Note, Plurality Decisions and Judicial Decisionmaking, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1127
n.1 (1981). A significant number of the plurality decisions in this article relate to matters
affecting the exclusionary rule.
77. L. PIRANDELLO, SIX CHARACTERS IN SEARCH OF AN AUTHOR, ACT III.
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inevitably congruent, may be brought into reasonable juxtaposi-
tion by application of the foregoing techniques.
In essence, the exclusionary rule is a rule of evidence
promulgated by the Supreme Court in implementation of its
guardianship of constitutional liberties. It is strong medicine in-
deed, but at times it may be the only appropriate medicine
which necessity, based upon either deterrence of lawless official
conduct or judicial integrity, will prescribe. It is not so much a
question of whether the exclusionary rule should be abandoned
as it is how the rule should be molded in order to achieve maxi-
mum effect and acceptability. As in the dramatic sphere, with
skill and precision, a rule may be crafted as a character may be
formed. In spite of Pirandello's model, our nine authors should
continue their assiduous search for a comprehensive and sym-
metrical set of relevant principles.
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